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This paper explores the motivations and desirability of off-balance-sheet financing of credit card receivables 
by banks. We explore three related issues: the degree to which securitizations result in the transfer of risk out 
of the originating bank, the extent to which securitization permits banks to economize on capital by avoiding 
regulatory minimum capital requirements, and whether banks’ avoidance of minimum capital regulation 
through securitization with implicit recourse has been undesirable from a regulatory standpoint. We show 
that this intermediation structure could be motivated either by desirable efficient contracting in the presence 
of asymmetric information or by undesirable safety net abuse. We find that securitization results in some 
transfer of risk out of the originating bank but that risk remains in the securitizing bank as a result of implicit 
recourse. Clearly, then, securitization with implicit recourse provides an important means of avoiding 
minimum capital requirements. We also find, however, that securitizing banks set their capital relative to 
managed assets according to market perceptions of their risk and seem not to be motivated by maximizing 
implicit subsidies relating to the government safety net when managing their risk. Thus, the evidence is more 
consistent with the efficient contracting view of securitization with implicit recourse than with the safety net 
abuse view. Concerns expressed by policymakers about this form of capital requirement avoidance appear to 
be overstated.  I. Introduction 
Between 1980 and 2002, the average annual growth rate of consumer credit (93% of which is 
in the form of credit card receivables) was over 12% (Federal Reserve statistics reported in Deutsche 
Banc Alex. Brown 2002). Growth rates prior to 1987 averaged upwards of 15%. After 1987, 
securitization became integral to credit card industry growth. Citicorp led the sector through the 
capital crunch of the early 1990s, increasing its credit card accounts 42% between 1990 and 1992 by 
securitizing nearly two-thirds of its $33 billion portfolio (Card Industry Directory). Securitization 
helped restore the consumer finance sector to double-digit growth in 1993 and pushed growth to 
18% in 1994 and 22% in 1995. By 1996, securitized credit card receivables exceeded $180 billion, at 
which time credit cards comprised 48.4% of the non-mortgage ABS market. By 2001, credit card 
securitization had grown to $339.1 billion. In 2001, credit cards accounted for 28.2% of the non-
mortgage ABS market (Bond Market Association 2003), and securitized credit cards amounted to 
about half of all consumer credit.  
It is well known that credit card banks have been among the most intensive and innovative 
users of new market-oriented tools for financing their loans. Credit card bank reliance on these 
innovations has been an entirely private matter. Unlike the mortgage market, there are no 
government-sponsored agencies (GSEs) purchasing credit card receivables.  
A less well-known fact about the last decade’s financing of credit card receivables by banks is 
the diversity of bank behavior. Some banks financed the vast majority of the credit card receivables 
they originated with off-balance-sheet finance, while others (roughly 275 of the top 300 issuers in 
2000) retained all of the receivables they originated, financing them with bank equity and debt as 
they would other types of bank loans. Banks that retain the receivables on-balance-sheet, however, 
accounted for only around 40% of total outstanding receivables in 2000. Hence, credit card asset-
backed securitizations (ABS) are relatively small in number but large in asset share.  
  1Observers of the phenomenal growth in credit card securitization over recent years have 
pointed to numerous advantages that come from securitizing assets. These include (1) the carving up 
of risks into senior-subordinate tranches to better match the preferences of potential financing 
sources, (2) reducing the adverse-selection costs of financing receivables by isolating credit card 
accounts and placing them under the continuing scrutiny of market participants (including securities 
purchasers, ratings agencies, credit enhancers, and conduit trustees), and (3) reducing the costs of 
maintaining equity capital by avoiding the high regulatory equity capital requirements attendant to 
on-balance-sheet holdings of bank credit card receivables.  
That last advantage has been questioned by regulators, who have become increasingly 
concerned that off-balance-sheet finance is often a form of undesirable “regulatory arbitrage.” 
Regulators have accused banks of overstating the value of their retained interests in securitized 
assets and of keeping the risks of securitized assets on their balance sheets by providing implicit 
recourse to securitization trusts. Regulators argue that securitizing banks have effectively reduced 
their regulatory capital requirements without commensurately reducing their asset risk.  
The controversy over the equity capital savings resulting from credit card securitization – and, 
more generally, from bank securitization of all assets – revolves around the question of whether the 
level of capital maintained by securitizing banks is adequate in light of the assets originated and 
managed by those banks and the attendant risks the banks retain from their on- and off-balance-
sheet activities. Regulators see securitization’s subversion of capital requirements as a threat to 
financial system risk and as an attempt to reap implicit subsidies from the federal safety net. Bankers 
argue that, for some classes of assets, regulatory capital requirements are too high relative to what 
should be required as equity capital backing. Banks financing credit card receivables, in particular, 
see regulatory arbitrage as a means of restoring efficiency to credit card intermediation by reducing 
capital requirements to more reasonable levels, not as an abuse of the safety net.   
  2Our goals in this paper are to (1) measure the extent to which banks engage in regulatory 
capital arbitrage by retaining some risks from off-balance-sheet assets, and (2) evaluate the 
desirability of that regulatory arbitrage.  
Section II reviews the alleged problem of regulatory arbitrage through securitization with 
implicit recourse. Regulators argue that if banks believe that regulatory capital requirements are 
excessive for credit card receivables, then banks should securitize those receivables through “true 
sales” and not retain risk in securitized assets through implicit recourse. The ability to retain risk 
opens the door to capital regulation arbitrage and abuse of the government safety net (purposeful 
reductions of capital relative to risk retained by the originating bank). The typical motivation for 
prudential minimum capital regulation is to protect against safety net abuse (Shadow Financial 
Regulatory Committee 2000). We review the evolution of the “safety net abuse” view of 
securitization with recourse and the attempts by regulators to limit the use of implicit recourse, 
which have been ineffectual to date.  
In Section III, we show that, in theory, securitization with implicit recourse may be efficient, 
rather than an attempt to abuse government safety net protection by maintaining inadequate capital. 
We call this the “efficient contracting” view of securitization with implicit recourse. A combination 
of excessively high regulatory capital requirements, problems of adverse selection in valuing credit 
card receivables, and institutional prohibitions on non-bank credit card intermediation may make 
bank securitization with recourse the best available means of financing credit card receivables. 
Furthermore, the contracting structure through which implicit recourse is provided (i.e., where 
recourse from originators avoids the triggering of costly early amortization) can be seen as a means 
of ensuring credible, incentive-compatible increases in the allocation of risk to originating banks in 
bad states of the world, when adverse-selection costs make that reallocation of risk efficient. In a 
dynamic context, that voluntary form of assistance can also be an important means of signaling 
  3credit quality by originators. 
Section IV analyzes the asset characteristics of credit card banks and the relationship between 
capital structure and risk management decisions (in 1996 and 2000), both for those that securitize 
and those that do not. We distinguish between the empirical implications of the “safety net abuse” 
and “efficient contracting” views of securitization with recourse. We show that the behavior of 
securitizers is more consistent with the efficient contracting view than the safety net abuse view of 
securitization with implicit recourse. The amount of capital relative to risk retained by originating 
banks is determined by the market and is substantially above the minimum required by regulation. 
Rather than being set with the intent of extracting a subsidy from the government safety net, 
reductions in effective capital ratios through securitization with partial recourse seem to be the 
outcome of market judgments about capital adequacy relative to risk.  Section V concludes. 
 
II. The Regulatory Critique of Securitization  
Regulators and ratings agencies have long recognized that securitizing credit card receivables 
may be profitable because the market requires less capital in support of these loans than do 
regulators and because securitization reduces other regulatory costs associated with on-balance-sheet 
banking (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1997).
1 Yet regulators, seeking to avoid abuse of 
the safety net through regulatory capital arbitrage, have argued that securitization should be pure in 
its transfer of risk; either banks should keep their loan risks on their balance sheet (and have their 
minimum capital regulated accordingly), or they should sell/securitize those assets without any 
hidden recourse allowing the transfer of losses to originating banks if securitized assets perform 
                                                 
1 In addition to minimum bank capital requirements, another institutional incentive to finance credit cards off-
balance-sheet was important for credit card banks owned by non-bank parents (CEBA banks). These banks, which often 
specialize in creating credit cards usable only for purchases of products from those parents, have become a large 
segment of the credit card industry (a group we will call “retail CEBA banks”). Retail CEBA banks faced special 
incentives to securitize prior to 1997 owing to an annual 7 percent limit on their on-balance-sheet asset growth (under 
  4badly.  
The concern of regulators about capital arbitrage is captured by James’ (1987) analysis of 
deposit insurance-protected banks’ desire to limit capital and retain risk to maximize the value of the 
put option inherent in the government safety net. Banks that reduce capital and increase risk 
(including via contingent, off-balance-sheet liabilities) can increase the value of their equity in the 
bank so long as deposit insurance premia do not increase commensurate with increased default risk. 
Prudential capital requirements are the first line of defense for protecting taxpayers or other banks 
(which finance the insurance fund) from such abuse. By reducing the risk of default, capital limits 
the gain banks can enjoy on the margin from abusive increases in risk. Also, higher capital can affect 
incentives through the risk aversion of bank stockholders; so long as risk-averse bank stockholders 
maintain a large stake in future losses (through their holdings of equity capital), they will have an 
interest in limiting risk taking by bank management (Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee 2000). 
 
Implicit Recourse 
The sale of loans and other collateral for the purpose of securitization is governed by FASB 
140, which is generally reiterated by bank supervisors (see, for instance, Rosenblatt and Johnson 
2001). Under FASB 140, the sale of loans from originator to a trust (special purpose entity, or SPE) 
must be a “true sale.” A true sale may not contain terms whereby the issuer will be responsible for 
the subsequent performance or condition of the collateral. Otherwise, terms tying subsequent 
performance back to the original issuer would constitute recourse and require that the issuer hold 
regulatory capital against the full value of the collateral transferred. 
The permissible exceptions to recourse in a “true sale” are those for “clean-up calls” and 
“removal of accounts provisions” (ROAPs). Clean-up calls are used toward the maturity of the issue 
                                                                                                                                                             
the 1987 CEBA statute). 
  5to facilitate a smooth wind-down of the collateral principal in the event that repayments do not 
provide that wind-down naturally. ROAPs are commonly used on revolving transactions such as 
credit cards, allowing the issuer, for instance, to remove delinquent accounts from a pool to give the 
issuer maximum workout flexibility (but not simply to absorb a larger amount of losses). ROAPs 
also may be used to absorb losses associated with fraud. Finally, ROAPs may be required in the event 
that a credit card issuer maintains accounts under affinity relationships. If an issuer loses an affinity 
contract, it may have to remove those accounts to sell an affinity portfolio. 
But, in practice, credit card securitization recourse has been far greater than these permissible 
exceptions. Concerns with implicit recourse as a means of regulatory capital arbitrage in credit card 
ABS began soon after the first securitization in 1987. By 1991 it became clear that issuers sometimes 
pushed the ROAP exceptions to bolster pool performance and avoid early amortization (see a more 
detailed discussion of early amortization in Section III). In May 1991, Citibank became the first 
known issuer to provide recourse to its credit card trusts in order to avoid early amortization. In 
September and October 1991, Sears followed by adding new, higher quality accounts to several 
series in the Sears Credit Account Trust and removed some early amortization triggers to keep these 
series from unwinding. Similar actions by other originators soon followed, and between November 
1995 and March 1997 there were no fewer than 10 additional instances of originators undertaking 
implicit recourse. All of these cases were effected with the approval of bank regulators and without 
de jure violation of FASB 140 (Higgins and Mason 2002).  
In late 1996, regulators began expressing concern over the preponderance of recourse and the 
possibility of regulatory capital arbitrage. Even at this early date, credit card banks and analysts 
already understood that these actions were in clear violation of FASB 140. A March 31, 1997 article 
from Asset Sales Report put the issue most directly and succinctly: 
We have long been of the opinion that credit card securitizations are financing mechanisms 
rather than bona fide sales of assets…We certainly have no problem with banks using the 
  6securitization markets as a source of funding. But pretending that the assets have really been 
sold is another matter. Banks want sales treatment because they don’t have to put up capital 
against securitized assets, and they don’t have to post loss reserves either. But clearly the 
risks of ownership have not passed to buyers of securitized paper. In theory, every 
securitization is supposed to stand on its own. The issuer puts up sufficient excess 
receivables or in some other fashion enhances the pool as to garner investor confidence. In 
fact, if buyers and sellers miscalculate, the seller has always made up the difference rather 
than expose the buyers to risk. Thus, the putative seller in fact passes on none of the risks of 
ownership.  
We don’t know how long the fiction of sales treatment will last. BancOne’s prolonged 
discussions with regulators indicate to us that the regulators are starting to think about these 
issues. (“Will Sales Treatment Survive a Recession?”). 
 
Regulators were beginning to express their concerns more forcefully. In late 1996, OCC 
Bulletin 1996-52: “Securitization-Guidelines for National Banks” maintained that “providing post-
sale enhancements to prior asset sales constitutes recourse and would require full risk-based capital 
support for the entire pool of assets…” The Comptroller’s Handbook in November 1997 reiterated 
those principles. Nonetheless, regulators seemed unwilling or unable to restrict implicit recourse, 
and the practices continued.  
In 1999, the OCC reiterated its concern in OCC Bulletin 1999-46: “Interagency Guidance on 
Asset Securitization Activities”: 
Recent examinations have disclosed significant weaknesses in the asset securitization 
practices of some insured depository institutions. These weaknesses raise concerns about the 
general level of understanding and controls among institutions that engage in such activities. 
The most frequently encountered problems stem from: (1) the failure to recognize and hold 
sufficient capital against explicit and implicit recourse obligations that frequently accompany 
securitizations… (p. 1). 
 
OCC Guidance 2002-20, “Interagency Guidance on Implicit Recourse in Asset Securitizations,” 
reiterates even more specifically, with explicit examples, actions that would be interpreted as implicit 
recourse: 
Banking organizations typically have provided implicit recourse in situations where the 
originating organization perceived that the failure to provide this support, even though not 
contractually required, would damage its future access to the asset-backed securities market. 
An originating banking organization can provide implicit recourse in a variety of ways. The 
ultimate determination as to whether implicit recourse exists depends on the facts. However, 
  7as discussed in detail later in this document, the following actions point to a finding of 
implicit recourse: 
•  Selling assets to a securitization trust or other special purpose entity (SPE) at a 
discount from the price specified in the securitization documents, which is typically 
par value; 
•  Purchasing assets from a trust or other SPE at an amount greater than fair value; 
•  Exchanging performing assets for nonperforming assets in a trust or other SPE; and 
•  Funding credit enhancements beyond contractual requirements. 
By providing implicit recourse, a banking organization signals to the market that the risks 
inherent in the securitized assets are still held by the organization and, in effect, have not 
been transferred … 
Particular attention should be paid to revolving securitizations, such as those used for 
credit card lines … where receivables generated by the lines are sold into the securitization. 
…Once an early amortization event occurs, the banking organization could have difficulties 
using securitization as a continuing source of funding and, at the same time, have to fund the 
new receivables generated by the lines of credit on its balance sheet. Thus, banking 
organizations have an incentive to avoid early amortization by providing implicit support to 
the securitization. (pp. 3-4). 
 
Notwithstanding the regulatory saber rattling, implicit recourse has continued with little 
regulatory action behind the strong talk. Although there were no explicit recourse events like those 
analyzed in Higgins and Mason (2002) from 1999 through 2002, recent events suggest that only the 
face of recourse has changed, and not its substance. Recourse was at the heart of events involving 
NextCard and First Consumers National Bank (owned by Spiegel) during 2001 and 2002. Cognizant 
of the regulatory risks of openly absorbing losses from delinquencies, these banks intervened into 
their securitization pools to absorb delinquency losses under the guise of absorbing “fraud loss,” 
which is legally permissible.  
In fall 2001 regulators issued an order that NextCard reclassify fraud expenses as credit 
chargeoffs and ruled “…credit risk [was] not truly transferred in the securitization. This would mean 
that NextCard has been subsidizing the securitizations by deducting credit loss (previously fraud 
loss) …. If NextBank was subsidizing its securitization, it would not qualify as true-sale from a 
regulatory perspective” (“NextCard ABS Back on Books”). As a result, the securitized loans were 
placed back on NextBank’s balance sheet, resulting in a sudden 35% increase in risk-weighted assets 
  8and a decrease in regulatory capital from 17.35% in the second quarter of 2001 to 5.38% in the third 
quarter. NextBank was subsequently seized by the FDIC and its securitizations, lacking a buyer, 
were allowed to enter early amortization. 
Two things are noteworthy about this transaction. First, as late as fall of 2001, banks had 
assumed that they could avoid any regulatory discipline associated with implicit recourse by simply 
re-labeling delinquency losses as fraud losses. Clearly, regulatory discipline had not been an effective 
deterrent to recourse. Second, even after the NextBank debacle, regulators did not act to prevent the 
same practices from affecting their measures of regulatory capital in other banks. The balance-sheet 
treatment of NextBank’s recourse was an aberration, not the beginning of a new regulatory rule. 
After the NextBank transaction, First Consumers’ securitizations underwent a similar 
reclassification, but those loans were not placed back on First Consumers’ balance sheet. First 
Consumers’ securitizations did eventually enter early amortization owing to fundamental pool 
performance, but not because of regulatory discipline, as in the case of NextBank. First Consumers 
is not an exception. As of the end of 2002, it appeared that there existed other banks with 
suspiciously high reported fraud losses, suggesting such classification may be a source of more 
continuous recourse that has replaced earlier discrete recourse events of the type analyzed by 
Higgins and Mason (2002). 
To summarize, regulators have been increasingly critical of implicit recourse. Nevertheless, 
despite a great deal of talk by regulators about the dangers of implicit recourse, there is little 
evidence that banks have been prevented from resorting to this means of reducing regulatory capital 
requirements by pretending that off-balance-sheet assets do not enjoy recourse. In our empirical 
analysis in Section IV, we find no evidence of any change in the ability of securitizers to engage in 
regulatory arbitrage through implicit recourse from 1996 to 2000. 
 
  9III. Securitization with Implicit Recourse as Efficient Contracting 
Thus far, the view that we have presented of securitization with implicit recourse has been the 
jaundiced perspective of those who have regarded securitization with implicit recourse as a means of 
undesirable regulatory arbitrage. But there is another view of securitization with implicit recourse. It 
is possible that this arrangement allocates risk and budgets capital more efficiently than pure 
securitization without recourse, intermediation by banks on their balance sheets, or any other 
feasible means of intermediating credit card receivables through non-bank intermediaries.  
Three elements combine to explain the potential efficiency of this arrangement: (1) bank 
capital regulation, (2) adverse selection costs, and (3) other regulations that force banks to make 
recourse implicit and that prevent non-bank intermediaries from offering an alternative to bank 
securitization with implicit recourse. The efficiency argument begins with the efficiency gain from 
economizing on scarce equity capital by avoiding the high minimum regulatory requirements set for 
banks.
2 Because of adverse-selection costs, securitizing banks must retain much of the risk 
associated with securitized assets. Given current accounting and capital regulations, they can do so 
only by making recourse implicit (otherwise they would run afoul of FASB and the bank regulators). 
Of course, if other intermediaries (e.g., finance companies) could offer credit cards on equal terms 
with banks, they might be able to offer a superior contracting alternative. But an institutional 
constraint (the VISA-Mastercard duopoly) effectively limits credit card issuers to commercial banks. 
Otherwise, non-bank intermediaries would be able to securitize with explicit recourse or simply 
maintain lower (unregulated) capital ratios for their on-balance-sheet intermediation. In the presence 
of these various constraints, it may be that the most efficient means of intermediating credit card 
receivables is bank securitization with implicit recourse.  
                                                 
2 Equity capital is a relatively costly form of finance because of adverse-selection premia charged by outside investors 
who are asked to purchase bank equity (see Myers and Majluf 1984 and Calomiris and Mason 2003). 
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the absence of legal impediments to explicit recourse. As we argue below, implicit recourse allows 
assistance by the originating bank to be made voluntarily ex post, and in some states of the world 
(when market access for the pool is not worth preserving) assistance would not be offered. The 
signaling gains from voluntary assistance may favor a reliance on implicit, rather than explicit, 
recourse. 
Is it plausible to argue that adverse selection costs motivate the retention of risk by credit card 
originators? To understand this motivation for implicit recourse, it is necessary to review the 
information structure of credit card intermediation.  
 
Asymmetric Information in Credit Card Origination 
The banking literature has stressed banks’ special role as information collectors and processors 
(for a review of this literature, see Calomiris and Ramirez 1996). In the case of credit card lending, 
however, one might doubt that banks possess private information about their customers. In business 
lending, bank information about firms is derived from screening and monitoring by the bank, and 
much of the information collected remains private. In contrast, in credit card lending, much of the 
information about customers’ observable characteristics is shared publicly. Consumer credit reports 
(e.g., based on Fair Isaac Co. credit scores) offer detailed credit records on virtually all credit card 
holders, which are equally available to the issuer of the credit card, to its competitors, and to others 
with access to the reports.  
There is, however, one important aspect of credit card lending that does result in private 
information retained by issuing banks: the means by which the bank attracted the customer. 
Unobservable characteristics of customers may make them more or less likely to choose some credit 
card marketing schemes over others. For example, some particular combinations of interest rate 
  11discounts, frequent flier miles, and other perquisites (which are known only by the customer and the 
offering bank) may be more or less attractive to (otherwise unobservably) low-default risk 
customers.  
There is significant heterogeneity across credit card banks in their strategies for attracting 
customers. Fitch (1996, p. 2) pointed out that some credit card banks – Advanta, Capital One, and 
First USA – specialized in attracting customers with low-price cards but consequently suffered a 
greater probability of attracting poor credit quality customers. Other banks – MBNA, Household, 
GM, Citibank, and Chemical – in contrast specialized in promoting affinity or co-branded cards, 
which tend to attract higher-quality customers. The recent histories of these two groups of banks 
confirm Fitch’s view of the lower portfolio quality associated with low-price cards.  
The importance of unobserved determinants of default risk is emphasized by ratings agencies. 
Because these unobservable attributes are important for credit risk, ratings agencies penalize young 
(unseasoned) credit cards in the portfolios they rate. For example, Fitch’s credit card default model 
distinguishes between seasoned credit cards and new credit cards because of their concern about 
how the credit card customer was attracted. Fitch (1996, p. 7) writes:  
Examining the credit limits and APRs of a portfolio…does not always give a true picture of 
the issuer’s total risk. Some issuers might be more aggressive in assigning high limits to lower 
credit quality borrowers. Some might not have well-developed scoring models. Finally, some 
may try to gain market share by offering very low interest rates, possibly at the expense of 
credit quality… 
...since every credit card is not created equal, more attention must be paid to the 
dynamics of each variable stressed in context with that portfolio… For example, the stress 
test [Fitch performs on portfolios] applies to the Household Affinity Credit Card Master 
Trust… 
Household’s underwriting criteria is strong, and, to date, the trust’s performance has 
been better than expected. However, since Household’s portfolio is not heavily seasoned 
and has not been tested during a recessionary environment, Fitch imposes a slightly more 
conservative chargeoff multiple. As the average age of the accounts increases, Fitch will 
revisit this stress and adjust it accordingly.  
Fitch’ s discussion mirrors the academic literature on adverse selection and the connection 
between adverse selection and the retention of risk by loan originators. In the context of corporate 
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about their customers, loans sold will also suffer “undeserved” adverse selection discounts from the 
marketplace, and the discount will be increasing in the extent of the information problem and in the 
riskiness of the loan (for any given extent of asymmetric information). They show (theoretically and 
empirically) that higher-risk categories of loans (for which asymmetric information is relatively 
important) require greater credit enhancement from the originating bank than low-risk loan types. 
Banks are unlikely to find it cost effective to ask outsiders to bear credit risk if outsiders’ abilities to 
measure that risk are far inferior to those of the originating banks.  
A corollary of the proposition that asymmetric information limits risk transference from 
banks is that as the bank’s asymmetric information problem is mitigated by market learning about 
customer characteristics over time, the lemons discount on the portfolio of receivables will also fall 
(see Diamond 1989 for a model of learning in such an environment). The decline in the lemons 
discount will be reflected in both the amount of risk securitized and the price paid for the securities. 
As that happens (as the bank’s comparative advantage in bearing default risk declines), it will 
become efficient for the bank to reduce its capital buffer, credit enhancement, or pledged collateral, 
and let the riskiness of the master trust’s debt rise. In practice, unseasoned credit card receivables 
tend to be placed in conduits where outsiders are forced to bear virtually no default risk, while 
seasoned receivables tend to be placed in trusts with longer maturity and riskier debt. Sophisticated 
outside investors skilled at pricing risk may purchase higher-risk tranches of debt, leaving the most 
senior debt for less sophisticated investors. As Fitch (1996, p. 11) shows, the segmentation of debt 
into different risk tranches is a common feature of credit card ABS.  
 
Early Amortization Triggers, Time Varying Risk Allocation, and Signaling 
Of course, “reverse seasoning” may also happen. Credit risk can become less transparent over 
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retention of risk by originating banks. Indeed, the means through which implicit recourse occurs in 
credit card master trust securitizations (i.e., the mechanism of early amortization) ensures that the 
extent to which originating banks absorb risk on the margin increases as delinquencies increase or 
other problems arise. Thus, the structure of implicit recourse not only leads to greater risk 
absorption on average but ensures that marginal risk absorption increases in uncontractable bad 
states of the world. 
Early amortization clauses, in conjunction with implicit recourse, are the means through which 
banks absorb increasing amounts of risk as adverse-selection problems become greater. Standard 
contractual provisions and structures for asset-backed securities vary considerably across collateral 
types. Credit card deals are structured with a high risk of early amortization (payout), which can 
occur for a variety of reasons, including an increase in delinquencies. In early amortization, the 
securities are repurchased by the issuing trust according to the contractual terms. The trust may have 
to raise cash to fund the purchase by selling the loans. Because of the fundamental asymmetric 
information regarding the origination technology underlying the quality of the portfolio, the sale will 
be subjected to a substantial adverse-selection discount if purchased by any firm other than the 
issuing bank. If a bank subjects asset-backed security investors to such adverse-selection discount 
losses, those investors may become reluctant to purchase future ABS from the bank, effectively 
raising the bank’s future funding costs. Thus, it may be less costly for banks to avoid early 
amortization by intervening (through implicit recourse) to improve the receivables pool and thereby 
avoid early amortization. 
In effect, the early amortization provision provides a credible incentive for originating banks 
to assist their credit card pools (and absorb increasing amounts of risk) during high-delinquency (or 
other problem) states. Implicit recourse to prevent early amortization can also be seen as a means 
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a viable long-term investment. The reason implicit recourse may work as a signal is that it is not 
mandatory. The fact that banks step in to improve the asset quality of their ailing master trusts does 
not imply that banks are providing an unconditional guarantee to master trust debtholders. Many 
intermediaries, including uninsured intermediaries like commercial paper dealers, voluntarily bail out 
customers to preserve their reputations (see Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor 1993). But in extreme 
default states (where the costs of a bailout are large relative to the value of a continuing reputation), 
such bailouts are not forthcoming. In other words, if banks were suffering general distress or if they 
believed that the profitability of future credit card securitization was low (owing to their beliefs 
about the riskiness of their credit card customers), one would not expect banks to provide assistance 
to their master trusts. Thus, early amortization can be thought of as an incentive-compatibility 
device that ensures efficient risk sharing in the presence of asymmetric information. The fact that 
banks sometimes voluntarily improve the quality of troubled credit card portfolios can be a profit 
maximizing strategy and need not imply an absence of some credit risk transference to the 
debtholders of the master trusts.  
 
IV. Empirical Analysis of Credit Card Securitization 
In our empirical work, we investigate whether the “safety net abuse” or “efficient contracting” 
views of securitization with implicit recourse offer a better characterization of the data. The two 
alternative theoretical views of regulatory capital arbitrage and implicit recourse have differing 
implications for the behavior of credit card banks.  
According to the efficient contracting view, healthy banks with scarce capital (faster growing 
banks) will see the greatest advantage to off-balance-sheet finance. Furthermore, if banks are 
establishing contracts to satisfy the marketplace, they will be setting their capital adequately to 
  15absorb risk, as measured by the market. Thus, banks may choose to maintain levels of capital in 
excess of their minimum regulatory requirements as a means of satisfying market requirements. 
Bank capital should vary with market perceptions of bank asset risk (including both on-balance-
sheet and off-balance-sheet asset risks).  
According to the safety net abuse view (following James 1987), if off-balance-sheet finance is 
motivated by the maximization of the deposit insurance subsidy, then banks that stand to gain the 
most from increasing the put option value of deposit insurance will be more likely to securitize and 
will securitize to a greater extent. Furthermore, if securitizing banks are seeking to maximize the put 
option value of the safety net, then they would tend to maintain capital levels close to their 
minimum regulatory requirements.  
Thus, to distinguish between the safety net abuse and efficient contracting views, we analyze 
the characteristics of securitizing credit card banks and their capital structure choices. 
 
Data 
Our data set combines bank call report data, bank holding company Y-9 reports, and off-
balance-sheet data on the quantity and quality of managed credit card receivables of credit card 
banks from Faulkner and Gray’s Card Industry Directory. Our sample is confined to the chartered, 
non-CEBA, commercial banks listed as among the top 300 credit card receivables managers in 
Faulkner & Gray for 1996 and 2000. We chose these dates so that we could investigate the extent to 
which changes in the regulation of implicit recourse over time might affect our conclusions.
3  
                                                 
3 Between 1996 and 2000 credit card ABS structures also changed in ways that could potentially affect capital 
structure and risk. Increasingly, credit card ABS were sold through master trusts (rather than discrete trusts), wherein the 
receivables sold this period may be intermingled with those sold in previous periods, adding time-series diversification to 
the master trust pool performance. Also, over time, master trusts came to use tiered structures, involving “secondary 
note trusts,” which permit banks to transfer more of their residual tranches to other investors.  
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importance of securitization as a means of finance, the composition and size of our sample of 
commercial bank credit card issuers changed dramatically from 1996 to 2000. In 1996, our sample 
consisted of 96 banks, 47 of which did not engage in securitizations. By 2000, our sample consisted 
of only 7 banks, all of whom were securitizers. Our sample is small in 2000 for various reasons. 
First, the consolidation of the credit card industry substantially reduced the number of credit card 
banks between 1996 and 2000. Second, consolidation and other factors limited our ability to 
construct consistent time series data for surviving credit card banks over that period. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the pooled sample of 103 credit card bank observations 
for 1996 and 2000, which are separated into subgroups in two ways. First, we divide observations 
according to whether the issuer is involved in securitization or not (56 with and 47 without off-
balance-sheet activity). Second, we construct a sub-sample of 77 observations for banks and bank 
holding companies that are relatively specialized in credit card banking. We constructed that sample 
of 77 banks by removing the quartile of banks with the lowest proportion of managed credit card 
receivables relative to total consolidated assets.
4 Note, however, that “relatively specialized” does not 
mean that the bank or holding company is primarily a credit card bank; on average, the ratio of 
credit card receivables relative to total assets for bank holding company “specialists” is still only 8.7 
percent.  
The reason to divide the sample according to the degree of credit card specialization is that, to 
some extent, holding companies may target capital relative to the risk of the holding company as a 
                                                 
4 We constructed our measure of securitized credit card receivables for our sample of credit card banks by computing 
the difference between managed credit card receivables from Faulkner and Gray’s Card Industry Directory for 1996 and 
2000 and on-balance-sheet credit card receivables from call reports. Faulkner and Gray sometimes reports data at the 
holding company level. Where there existed no primary source of credit card lending within the holding company, the 
managed assets were assigned to the consolidated holding company, but not to any one of its subsidiary banks. To 
measure managed assets, we subtracted on-balance-sheet credit card loans from bank assets, then added Faulkner and 
Gray’s managed credit card receivables to that measure of total balance-sheet assets less credit card loans held on the 
balance sheet. 
  17whole (although, from a regulatory standpoint, both the bank and the holding company are subject 
to minimum capital requirements). Our unit of observation is the chartered “credit card” bank, not 
its holding company (which includes other banks and non-bank subsidiaries of the holding 
company). Dividing the sample according to the importance of credit card banking within the 
holding company allows us to investigate whether focusing attention on credit card banks within 
relatively “specialized” bank holding companies improves our understanding of credit card banks’ 
target capital ratios (which it does). Of the 77 credit card banks in 1996 and 2000 that are housed in 
relatively specialized bank holding companies, 47 securitize. 
 
Findings 
The average capital ratios reported in Table 1 are expressed in two ways: tier 1 plus tier 2 
capital as a fraction of total on-balance-sheet assets, which we call cap1n2ta, and tier 1 plus tier 2 
capital as a fraction of “managed assets” (the sum of on-balance-sheet assets and off-balance-sheet 
credit card receivables), which we call cap1n2ma. It is possible that banks in our sample also 
maintain other off-balance-sheet assets, which are not included in our definition of managed assets. 
Minimum capital requirements for banks involve a combination of minimum requirements. 
“Well-capitalized” banks must satisfy both a maximum leverage requirement as a fraction of total 
assets and a risk-based capital requirement, which has two parts: tier 1 capital / risk-weighted assets 
> 0.04, and tier 1 plus tier 2 capital / risk-weighted assets > 0.08. Since risk-weighted assets are less 
than total (on-balance-sheet) assets, a capital ratio of 0.08 for cap1n2ta implies that a bank is 
maintaining capital above all of its minimum required capital ratios. As a general rule (given the 
absence of explicit recourse in securitizations of credit card receivables), only on-balance-sheet assets 
are relevant for computing the minimum required ratios.   
As Table 1 shows, credit card banks that securitize actually maintain higher average ratios of 
  18capital to total on-balance-sheet assets (0.102) than credit card banks that do not securitize (0.092). 
Median capital ratios are also higher for securitizers. This is an important fact. Securitizers maintain 
far more than the minimum amount of capital required by regulation and tend to maintain a greater 
amount of “excess” capital (relative to regulatory requirements) than do non-securitizing banks.  
Table 2 provides a more detailed comparison of different types of credit card banks’ capital 
ratios and compares credit card banks’ capital ratios to those of all banks. No matter which 
definition of capital one focuses on relative to on-balance-sheet assets (equity, tier 1, or tier 1 plus 
tier 2), securitizing credit card banks have higher average capital ratios (relative to on-balance-sheet 
assets) than either non-securitizing credit card banks or U.S. chartered banks as a whole. 
These facts are not consistent with the “safety net abuse” view of securitization. If securitizers 
were trying to maximize the put option value of the safety net, they would maintain regulatory 
capital at or near the required minimum. 
When one examines the ratio of capital to “managed assets” (on-balance-sheet assets plus off-
balance-sheet credit card receivables), one sees that credit card securitizers do maintain capital ratios 
relative to the sum of on- and off-balance-sheet assets that are lower than those of non-securitizing 
credit card banks or of all banks. This is an indication of “regulatory capital arbitrage” – by 
securitizing, banks are able to reduce their capital relative to assets below what they would have to 
maintain if assets were retained on the balance sheet. The average and median capital ratio relative to 
managed assets for securitizers is 0.08, and many of these banks have capital ratios of less than 7% 
(as shown in Figure 1). 
As noted before, there are two views of the motivations for regulatory capital arbitrage. 
According to the “safety net abuse” view, banks with low ratios of capital to managed assets are 
trying to maximize the put option value of the safety net. According to the “efficient contracting” 
view, banks are on a “market margin” that determines their risk-based capital (which explains why 
  19their capital relative to on-balance-sheet assets is higher than that of other banks, since implicit 
recourse for off-balance-sheet assets requires that they hold higher capital to compensate for that 
risk).  
The relatively low ratios of capital to managed assets for securitizers, according to this view, is 
the result of market perceptions that lower capital relative to managed assets is adequate for these 
banks. That market determination reflects a combination of two factors. First, securitizers with 
relatively low ratios of capital to managed assets may be originating lower-risk credit card 
receivables. Second, although implicit recourse involves the retaining of some risk on securitized 
receivables, securitizers are not retaining all the risk for securitized receivables, since there are states 
of the world in which other investors in securitized assets would not be fully protected by issuers. 
That implies that the amount of capital needed to stand behind securitized receivables should be less 
than the amount needed to stand behind receivables held on the balance sheet; hence, ceteris 
paribus, capital ratios relative to managed assets should be declining in the proportion of assets that 
are securitized. 
To further investigate the determinants of credit card banks’ capital ratios, in Table 3 we 
report OLS regression results for two sets of regressions in which capital ratios are the dependent 
variables: one set uses capital relative to on-balance-sheet assets to measure the capital ratio, while 
the other uses capital relative to managed assets. For each of the two categories of regressions, the 
first three columns include the entire sample of credit card banks, while the fourth column excludes 
the quartile of credit card banks whose bank holding companies were least involved in credit card 
banking.  
If the market determines the risk-based capital maintained by credit card banks, then we 
should find four things to be true: (1) capital relative to managed assets increases as the riskiness of 
the receivables rises, ceteris paribus, (2) capital relative to managed assets is an increasing function of 
  20the proportion of assets held as loans rather than government securities, ceteris paribus, (3) capital 
relative to managed assets decreases as the ratio of securitized assets relative to total managed assets 
rises, ceteris paribus (since the risk retained on securitized assets via implicit recourse is less than the 
risk retained for on-balance-sheet receivables), and (4) the regression fit should be better when using 
the “managed capital ratio” definition of capital relative to assets rather than the “regulatory capital 
ratio” (capital relative to on-balance-sheet assets). All four predictions are confirmed in Table 3. 
Interestingly, the standard deviation of past due credit card receivables seems to be a better indicator 
of credit card risk than the current level of past due receivables.
5 The fit for the model is better when 
we exclude the quartile of banks whose holding companies are least involved in credit card 
intermediation. 
The adjusted R-squareds are much higher for the managed capital ratio regressions than for 
the regulatory capital ratio regressions. Figure 1 shows graphically how much better the model is at 
explaining the managed capital ratio than the regulatory capital ratio, and that this is particularly true 
for securitizing banks. Notice that the line relating  
actual and predicted managed capital ratios for securitizers (Linear cap1n2ma (ABS)) is upward 
sloping, while the line relating actual and predicted regulatory capital ratios for securitizers (Linear 
cap1n2ta (ABS)) is flat.  
We investigate two other questions in Table 3. According to the safety net abuse view, banks 
that raise more of their funds from insured deposits should face stronger motivations to keep capital 
small, since doing so would increase the put option value of deposit insurance. We include the ratio 
of insured deposits to total deposits, which according to the safety net abuse view, should enter 
                                                 
5 The standard deviation of the ratio of past due loans is derived from on-balance-sheet credit card receivables that are 
either past due by more than 90 days or in non-accrual, divided by total on-balance-sheet credit card receivables. We use 
all available annual data from December call reports, beginning in 1984 and ending in the sample year, to compute the 
standard deviation. We omit banks with fewer than three annual observations from our sample. 
  21negatively. The estimated coefficients are negative but are insignificantly different from zero. We 
also test to see if banks’ capital ratios are significantly different in 2000 (in response to greater 
regulatory criticisms of implicit recourse). Our 2000 sample is small, but there is no evidence for a 
significant change in capital relative to risk from 1996 to 2000 (see also Figure 2). The significant 
negative coefficient on the 1996 dummy in the regulatory capital regression appears to be a spurious 
result, reflecting the fact that all banks present in the 2000 sample are securitizers (which maintain 
higher regulatory capital ratios). The managed capital ratio regression is able to capture differences in 
capital targeting for securitizers and non-securitizers, and once those differences are captured, there 
is no significant difference between behavior in 1996 and in 2000. 
One potential concern about the regressions reported in Table 3 is the endogeneity of the 
choice of whether to be a securitizer. To deal with this potential problem, in Tables 4 and 5 we 
construct a two-step procedure that corrects for selectivity bias (in the first-stage regressions, 
reported in Table 4) before estimating the determinants of the managed capital ratio (in Table 5). We 
employ two alternative first-stage models, a probit and a tobit. The probit model assumes that 
selection bias pertains to whether one securitizes or not; the tobit model also allows the extent of 
securitization (relative to managed assets) to be controlled for in the first-stage regression. We find 
the tobit model more informative, but we report both for purposes of comparison.  
There are three “instruments” used in the first-stage regressions (variables that determine 
whether and how much one securitizes, which are assumed not to determine risk-based capital 
targets): the total amount of credit card receivables managed, the growth rate of managed 
receivables, and the growth rate of capital. The first two instruments we expected to be positively 
associated with securitizing, and the third we expected to be negatively associated with securitization. 
The first instrument reflects the importance of scale economies in securitization, owing to the high 
transaction costs of establishing conduits and marketing their securities. The last two instruments 
  22reflect the importance of economizing on capital, which should be particularly relevant for a bank 
that is experiencing rapid growth in receivables relative to available capital. Our estimates confirm 
those predictions. 
We also found that the ratio of insured deposits to total deposits is a significant positive 
predictor of securitization. That fact is consistent with the safety net abuse view of securitization but 
may also reflect other factors (e.g., banks that securitize may simply not need to rely as much on 
wholesale sources of on-balance-sheet finance like large-denomination CDs for their financing). The 
fact that the ratio of insured deposits has no significant negative effect on managed capital ratios in 
Table 5 contradicts the safety net abuse view of securitization with implicit recourse. Results 
reported in Table 5 are quite similar in Table 3 and Figure 1, indicating that selection bias has little 
effect on our estimates of risk-based capital targeting. 
 
V. Conclusions 
It is not controversial to point out that off-balance-sheet credit card banking saves capital, nor 
is it controversial to argue that credit card securitization involves regulatory capital arbitrage and 
implicit recourse. The controversial question is whether the pursuit of regulatory capital arbitrage 
through securitization with implicit recourse has been a desirable form of efficient contracting or an 
undesirable means to reap safety net subsidies. Disagreement among current observers revolves 
around whether the savings in capital from off-balance-sheet activities is value-maximizing or 
deposit insurance subsidy-maximizing.  
According to the “safety net abuse” view of securitization with implicit recourse, the goal of 
securitization is to increase risk relative to capital to maximize the value of the safety net subsidy. 
According to the “efficient contracting” view, banks use securitization with recourse to permit them 
to set capital relative to risk in a manner consistent with market, rather than regulatory, capital 
  23requirements, and to permit them to overcome problems of asymmetric information in credit card 
intermediation.  
Our findings are consistent with the efficient contracting view. Our analysis of the cross-
sectional determinants of the decision to finance credit card receivables off-balance-sheet and the 
relationship between off-balance-sheet finance and on-balance-sheet capital suggests that 
securitization is motivated by legitimate capital saving and that capital is being maintained in a 
manner commensurate with market perceptions of risk. Contrary to the safety net abuse view, 
securitizers maintain capital ratios far above their regulatory minima and cross-sectional differences 
in the value of deposit insurance protection do not explain cross-sectional differences in capital 
structure.  
One caveat warrants emphasis. It would be inappropriate to use our evidence to argue that 
regulatory or supervisory concerns about abuse of the safety net are entirely unwarranted. It is 
possible that in the wake of substantial losses of capital and increases in credit card risk banks could 
abuse securitization in the manner regulators fear. The experience of the U.S. in the 1980s and the 
experiences of many other countries’ banking systems in the 1980s and 1990s have taught that 
insolvent banks protected by safety nets change their behavior to maximize risk as part of 
resurrection strategies. Abuse of the safety net has not been the story thus far in credit card 
securitization, but under different, adverse circumstances in the future, potential abuse remains a 
possibility. 
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  26Figure 1: Predicted vs. Actual Managed and Regulatory Capital Ratios  
of ABS and non ABS-issuing Banks 










































  27Figure 2: Predicted vs. Actual Managed Capital Ratios of  
ABS-issuing Banks in 1996 and 2000 
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  28Table 1: Summary Statistics for Sample Cohorts 
Variable 

















n Number of observations 103 47 49 7 77
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Median Median Median Median Median
(Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev)
abs Dummy for whether bank securitizes 0.544 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.597
1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.501) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.494)
abs_prop Proportion of managed credit card  0.113 0.000 0.171 0.470 0.151
portfolio securitized 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.488 0.000
(0.228) (0.000) (0.267) (0.189) (0.252)
cap1n2ma Tier 1 and 2 capital / managed assets 0.085 0.092 0.081 0.076 0.082
0.083 0.089 0.080 0.069 0.080
(0.032) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.031)
cap1n2ta Tier 1 and 2 capital / on-balance-sheet assets 0.098 0.092 0.098 0.133 0.098
0.092 0.089 0.092 0.116 0.092
(0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.057) (0.032)
cngsta Cash and government securities /  0.077 0.088 0.071 0.048 0.076
on-balance-sheet assets 0.059 0.057 0.064 0.061 0.061
(0.063) (0.077) (0.049) (0.029) (0.060)
lmccln_1 Log of managed credit card portfolio, 1 period lag 11.993 10.642 12.676 16.286 12.665
11.471 10.296 12.541 16.497 12.253
(2.523) (1.646) (2.416) (1.079) (2.524)
cc90sd Standard deviation of total loans greater than  0.011 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.012
90 days past due or in nonaccrual status / 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.008
total loans (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
tl90ta Total loans greater than 90 days past due or  0.011 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.011
in nonaccrual status / total loans 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.015 0.009
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009)
dlmr Growth of managed credit card portfolio  0.284 0.115 0.483 0.033 0.332
over past year (log difference) 0.067 0.058 0.114 -0.001 0.074
(1.179) (0.403) (1.649) (0.108) (1.335)
dlcap Growth of tier 1 and 2 capital over past  0.248 0.175 0.330 0.164 0.272
year (log difference) 0.159 0.148 0.201 0.184 0.180
(0.458) (0.180) (0.632) (0.142) (0.519)
y1996 Dummy for year=1996 0.932 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.909
1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
(0.253) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.289)
insdtd Insured deposits / total deposits 0.644 0.660 0.655 0.461 0.629
0.704 0.707 0.707 0.597 0.707
(0.216) (0.198) (0.199) (0.372) (0.234)
lbhcimp Log (managed credit card portfolio /  -3.079 -3.781 -2.668 -1.236 -2.447
BHC on-balance-sheet assets)  -3.498 -4.376 -2.995 -1.088 -2.592
(1.796) (1.416) (1.855) (1.646) (1.643)  
  29Table 2: Managed and Regulatory Capital Ratio Comparisons 
Variable 











n Number of observations 11,002           103 47 56 77
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Median Median Median Median Median
(Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev)
eqta Equity capital / on-balance-sheet assets 0.084 0.088 0.085 0.091 0.087
0.077 0.081 0.082 0.081 0.081
(0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.037) (0.032)
cap1ta Tier 1 capital / on-balance-sheet assets 0.083 0.083 0.081 0.084 0.081
0.076 0.076 0.076 0.075 0.075
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028)
cap1n2ta Tier 1 and 2 capital / on-balance-sheet assets 0.097 0.098 0.092 0.102 0.098
0.090 0.092 0.089 0.094 0.092
(0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032)
eqma Equity capital / managed assets 0.076 0.077 0.085 0.071 0.072
0.072 0.075 0.082 0.070 0.071
(0.028) (0.033) (0.030) (0.035) (0.030)
cap1ma Tier 1 capital / managed assets 0.072 0.073 0.081 0.066 0.068
0.068 0.069 0.076 0.065 0.067
(0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029)
cap1n2ma Tier 1 and 2 capital / managed assets 0.084 0.085 0.092 0.080 0.082
0.081 0.083 0.089 0.080 0.080
(0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.031)  
 
  30Table 3: OLS Models of Managed and Regulatory Capital Ratios 
Dependent Variable
n 103 103 103 77 103 103 103 77
R2 0.058 0.146 0.065 0.071 0.281 0.283 0.283 0.341
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.102 0.016 0.020 0.251 0.246 0.246 0.305
Variable Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Abbreviation Name (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev)
constant Constant 0.102 *** 0.140 *** 0.110 *** 0.105 *** 0.099 *** 0.105 *** 0.104 *** 0.099 ***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007)
abs Proportion of managed credit card portfolio  0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.001 -0.041 *** -0.042 *** -0.041 *** -0.042 ***
securitized (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
cngsta Cash and government securities /  -0.114 ** -0.099 ** -0.112 ** -0.139 ** -0.085 ** -0.082 ** -0.083 ** -0.096 **
on-balance-sheet assets (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.061) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049)
cc90sd Standard deviation of total loans greater than  0.504 * 0.617 ** 0.566 * 0.266 0.766 *** 0.785 *** 0.804 *** 0.595 **
90 days past due or in nonaccrual status / (0.373) (0.359) (0.382) (0.385) (0.324) (0.327) (0.332) (0.312)
total loans
tl90ta Total loans greater than 90 days past due or -0.125 -0.202 -0.189 -0.080 -0.364 -0.377 -0.404 -0.316
in nonaccrual status / total loans (0.377) (0.362) (0.387) (0.424) (0.328) (0.330) (0.337) (0.343)
y1996 Dummy for year=1996 -0.040 *** -0.007
(0.013) (0.012)
insdtd Insured deposits / total deposits -0.012 -0.007
(0.015) (0.013)
* (**) (***) statistically significant at the 10% (5%) (1%) level.
Regulatory Capital Ratio= Managed Capital Ratio=
Tier 1 and 2 capital / on-balance sheet assets Tier 1 and 2 capital / managed assets
 
  31Table 4: Selection Models of Managed Capital Ratios-First-round Probit and Tobit Model Results 
Dependent Variable
Model Type Probit Probit Probit Probit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
n 103 103 103 77 103 103 103 77
Log likelihood function -53.600 -52.994 -51.572 -33.960 -60.279 -59.846 -57.587 -45.537
Restricted log likelihood -71.001 -71.001 -71.001 -51.902 -84.738 -84.738 -84.738 -65.014
Chi squared 34.802 36.014 38.858 35.884 48.918 49.784 54.302 38.955
Variable Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Abbreviation Name (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev)
constant Constant -3.485 *** 3.018 -5.188 *** -4.671 *** -1.677 *** -1.951 *** -1.998 *** -1.816 ***
(0.854) -1.78E+05 (1.281) (1.231) (0.284) (0.413) (0.346) (0.366)
cngsta Cash and government securities /  -1.868 -1.759 -2.221 -0.847 -0.160 -0.212 -0.189 0.215
on-balance-sheet assets (2.323) (2.317) (2.380) (2.853) (0.823) (0.823) (0.798) (0.936)
lmccln_1 Log of managed credit card portfolio, 1 period lag 0.310 *** 0.285 *** 0.361 *** 0.386 *** 0.152 *** 0.162 *** 0.157 *** 0.158 ***
(0.072) (0.076) (0.080) (0.096) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026)
cc90sd Standard deviation of total loans greater than  -11.217 -11.238 -19.042 -16.063 2.540 2.396 0.362 2.606
90 days past due or in nonaccrual status / (16.254) (16.464) (17.023) (18.787) (5.778) (5.740) (5.736) (6.176)
total loans
tl90ta Total loans greater than 90 days past due or  12.179 12.911 18.540 23.685 -2.466 -2.864 -1.359 -0.821
in nonaccrual status / total loans (18.264) (18.233) (19.431) (24.290) (5.661) (5.641) (5.553) (6.417)
dlmr Growth of managed credit card portfolio  0.441 * 0.431 * 0.466 * 1.289 ** 0.071 ** 0.071 ** 0.073 ** 0.079 **
over past year (log difference) (0.319) (0.315) (0.333) (0.566) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037)
dlcap Growth of tier 1 and 2 capital over past  0.028 0.069 0.320 -0.150 -0.219 ** -0.240 *** -0.158 * -0.210 **
year (log difference) (0.418) (0.418) (0.490) (0.412) (0.097) (0.099) (0.098) (0.098)
y1996 Dummy for year=1996 -6.265 0.181
-1.78E+05 (0.193)
insdtd Insured deposits / total deposits 1.688 ** 0.410 **
(0.869) (0.233)
sigma Disturbance standard deviation (Tobit Model) 0.423 *** 0.420 *** 0.409 *** 0.418 ***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.048)
* (**) (***) statistically significant at the 10% (5%) (1%) level.
abs= abs_prop=
Dummy for whether bank securitizes Proportion of managed credit card portfolio securitized
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n 103 103 103 77 103 103 103 77
R2 0.160 0.158 0.192 0.205 0.283 0.288 0.288 0.341
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.106 0.142 0.149 0.246 0.243 0.243 0.295
Variable Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Abbreviation Name (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev)
constant Constant 0.111 *** 0.122 *** 0.118 *** 0.107 *** 0.094 *** 0.101 *** 0.097 *** 0.100 ***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
abs Dummy for whether bank securitizes -0.040 *** -0.043 *** -0.044 *** -0.034 ***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
abs_prop Proportion of managed credit card portfolio  -0.038 *** -0.038 *** -0.036 *** -0.042 ***
securitized (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
cngsta Cash and government securities /  -0.116 ** -0.115 ** -0.118 ** -0.120 ** -0.088 ** -0.086 ** -0.088 ** -0.096 **
on-balance-sheet assets (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.050)
cc90sd Standard deviation of total loans greater than  0.596 * 0.608 * 0.615 * 0.462 * 0.762 ** 0.784 ** 0.796 ** 0.596 **
90 days past due or in nonaccrual status / (0.399) (0.405) (0.416) (0.361) (0.333) (0.341) (0.348) (0.315)
total loans
tl90ta Total loans greater than 90 days past due or  -0.140 -0.134 -0.139 -0.148 -0.329 -0.334 -0.362 -0.318
in nonaccrual status / total loans (0.425) (0.434) (0.440) (0.418) (0.341) (0.347) (0.355) (0.357)
y1996 Dummy for year=1996 -0.010 -0.009
(0.015) (0.012)
insdtd Insured deposits / total deposits -0.008 -0.008
(0.016) (0.014)
lambda Inverse Mills ratio 0.023 *** 0.025 *** 0.027 *** 0.012 * 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.000
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
* (**) (***) statistically significant at the 10% (5%) (1%) level.
Using First-round Probit from Table 4 Using First-round Tobit from Table 4
Managed Capital Ratio= Managed Capital Ratio=
Tier 1 and 2 capital / managed assets Tier 1 and 2 capital / managed assets
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